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for the maintenance and support of the dependent. But can one
be considered justified in voluntarily decreasing his income (or
assuming additional obligations) if his alimony payments are
not:sufficient to support the dependent? To maintain the affirmative would be to deny the obligation itself. Thus the decision, in the writer's opinion, should be taken to mean that one
may not obtain the reduction of his alimentary obligations beyond the point of adequacy for the dependent by voluntarily reducing his ability to pay.
The decision in White v. Morris,16 however, is one with which
the writer cannot. agree. There it was declared that an alimony
award in favor of children made in a judgment of separation
was cancelled by a judgment of divorce between these parents
which simply made no provision for alimony. The writer expressed his views on this subject in reviewing a similar case decided three years ago and they need not be repeated here. 7
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
In Roy v. Board of Commissioners' a claim was made for
property on Lake Pontchartrain which had been appropriated
for levee purposes. The private ownership interests and limitations in riparian property depend primarily on the legal classification of the adjacent or superjacent body of water (i.e., river,
lake, sea, etc.; navigable or non-navigable). While the immediate
case resulted in a remand for further facts essential to final
determination, the court made the statement: "It is immaterial
whether the property be classified as sea shore, which, being
common property, belongs to no one in particular and is insusceptible of private ownership, or as the bed of a navigable lake,
ownership to which is vested in the state up to the high-water
mark, since in either event plaintiff would not be entitled to
compensation. ' '2
There have been conflicting opinions concerning the classi16. 236 La. 767, 109 So.2d 87 (1959).
17. See the writer's remarks on the decision in Thornton v. Floyd, 229 La.
237, 85 So.2d 499 (1956), in 17 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 311-13 (1957).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 237 La. 541, 111 So.2d 765 (1959).
2. Id. at 550, 111 So.2d at 768 (court's footnotes omitted).
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fication of Lake Pontchartrain, and some of the. stronger decisions classify it as an arm of the sea thereby making the land
at the water's edge "sea shore. ' 3 Even though it would make no
difference to the plaintiff in a particular case, the above language of the court would tend to accentuate confusion concerning
the legal classification of Lake Pontchartrain. It would be more
helpful in the stabilization of the jurisprudence on Lake Pontchartrain and the Louisiana rules of property if the court maintained consistency on the classification of this body of water.

SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS, AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY*
HarrietS. Daggett**
SUCCESSIONS

In Roy 0. Martin Lumber Company v. Strange' suit was instituted under the provisions of R.S. 9:171 et seq.,2 dealing with
the partition of an absentee's property by private sale, seeking
the partition of certain property in which the plaintiff owned a
31/32d interest, and a 1/32d interest being owned by the defendant. The defendant contended that the statutes were not applicable for the reason that her domicile was well known to the
plaintiff, and that because of her appearance through counsel of
her own choice, having been made counsel of record, she was not
an absentee within the meaning of the statute. The court, on
rehearing, held that the whole tenor of R.S. 9 :171 et seq. clearly
demonstrates that the provisions were only meant to apply to an
absentee whose whereabouts are unknown, who remains unknown, and who has made no appearance, either in person or by
counsel of record. The court supported its conclusion by reference to particular provisions of the statute requiring publication
of the notice of the filing of the petition in a newspaper and the
appointment of an attorney at law to "represent the absent, unlocated or deceased owner," stating that the former were intend3. See Comment, Seashore in Louisiana, 8 TUL. L. REV. 272 (1934).
*Grateful acknowledgment is hereby registered to my student and friend Dale
Powers for his work in the preparation of these materials.
*#Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
.1. 236 La. 77, 106 So.2d 723 (1958).
2. After institutionof this suit, LA- R.S. 9:171 et seq. (Supp. 1959) were
amended by La. Acts 1956, No. 534.

